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Fiscal Shackles or Unrestrained Rhetoric: 
Does EU Integration Constrain Social 
Welfare Spending?
Ryan Merriman 
While the radical-right’s anti-immigrant brand of Euroscepticism has been the focus of 
a large body of research, few authors have examined the increasingly influential Eurosceptic 
rhetoric among Europe’s Social Democratic and Socialist political parties. These groups 
tend to view the EU as an agent of globalization and therefore attribute the negative social 
consequences of globalization to European integration. In particular, they argue that Eu-
ropean integration forces EU member states to trim their state welfare budgets. I examine 
both the validity of, and motivation behind these claims. Using panel data on all current 
EU member states across two decades, I find no empirical justification for the arguments 
of Eurosceptics on the left. On average, centrist and leftist parties spend about 2 percent of 
GDP more on social welfare programs than their counterparts on the right independent of 
natural increases over time, economic performance, openness, and measures of European 
integration. These results indicate that, much like the Eurosceptics on the right, the con-
cerns of leftist Eurosceptics may represent more of a political calculation than a substantive 
policy concern.        
Euroscepticism is as old as European integration. Opponents on the right tend to 
focus on what they see as an existential cultural challenge posed by large influxes of Mus-
lim immigrants. Eurosceptics on the left focus instead on the potential European integra-
tion has to constrain government spending, thus eroding the generous welfare benefits that 
have become the hallmark of European societies (Marks et al. 2002). For far-left and social 
democratic parties, the effects of Europeanization are similar to the effects of globaliza-
tion—increased inequality, a regulatory race to the bottom, and ultimately a lower standard 
of living for the vast majority of Europeans. In other words, the exterior forces of European 
integration constrain the policy choices of domestic political actors. 
The majority of the literature on Euroscepticism focuses on xenophobic conservative 
parties but pays little attention to the Socialist and Social Democratic Eurosceptics across 
Europe. To what extent are their fears empirically justified? Have government expenditures 
noticeably declined among EU member states during the accession process? If so, are these 
declines directly attributable to the outside pressures of EU integration, or are internal do-
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mestic forces more important? The answers to these questions not only shed light on the 
desirability of European integration, but will also contribute to the heated debate about 
globalization. EU expansion and the economic, institutional, and political changes it entails 
present a unique opportunity to study the effects of increased monetary, economic, and 
political integration on the range of policy choices available to domestic political actors. 
Using panel data on current EU member states across two decades, I find that the 
general effect of EU enlargement on levels of social welfare spending has been negligible. 
Specifically, controlling for measures of European integration has no effect on the ability 
of leftist parties to maintain generous welfare benefits. Compared to parties on the right, 
leftist parties spend between 0.8 percent and 3.2 percent of GDP more on social welfare 
programs independent of economic performance, openness, natural increases over time, and 
Europeanization. While there is some evidence that monetary integration has capped overall 
levels of expenditures, the allocation of revenues to social protection, education, health care, 
defense, and education seem to be determined by domestic political processes.    
The paper proceeds as follows. I will first review some of the most relevant empirical 
and theoretical work on the determinants of public spending, outline a theoretical frame-
work, and present a more narrow research question. I will then propose several testable 
implications of the theory, describe my data sources, and specify the methodology I use to 
test each hypothesis. Finally, I will present the empirical results and conclude. 
Literature Review and Theoretical Framework
As a matter of history, public expenditures have increased dramatically and rapidly 
since World War II. Much of the public spending literature is an attempt to explain these 
increases, which appear to be consistent across industrialized countries. Figure 1 presents 
the most recent data on public spending levels between 1980 and 2008 among OECD 
countries. The OECD average social protection spending/GDP1 ratio increases steadily 
before tapering off slightly in the 2000s. This is consistent with historical trends and basic 
intuition—citizens have consistently demanded more services and regulatory expertise as 
the world has grown increasingly complex and interconnected. 
Figure 2 displays the social protection spending/GDP ratio for current EU member 
states, Western Europe, and Central and Eastern Europe since 1990. The results explain 
the leveling off of the OECD average in Figure 1, but are also fairly puzzling. Spending 
increases dramatically throughout the first half of the 1990s but begins to steadily decrease 
in 1995, and continues to decline till 2000 before leveling off through most of the decade.
The trajectory of social protection spending in Europe diverges from the rest of the 
OECD countries in the early 1990s. Coincidently, EU member states signed the Maastricht 
Treaty in 1992, which contained the monetary and fiscal requirements states had to meet in 
order to join the European Monetary Union (EMU). At first glance, Figure 2 could not fit 
the leftist Eurosceptic story any better—integration in the early 1990s permanently reduced 
the level of social welfare benefits across the European Union. While industrialized coun-
tries like Japan and the United States increased their state budgets, EU member states were 
tightening their belts.
The full story is not so simple. There are plenty of other factors aside from the Maas-
1 Social protection spending includes old-age pensions, low-income housing subsidies, sickness and disability pay-
ments, unemployment benefits, and other subsidies to low-income families.
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tricht Treaty’s monetary union requirements that could have influenced Europe’s recent 
drop in social protection spending. In the literature review that follows, I identify the most 
influential variables cited in the literature and make the case that pursuing EMU member-
ship could also lead to a drop in state spending.
The literature on public expenditures and the size of the welfare state fall broadly into 
two categories: theoretical and empirical. Even thirty years later, Cameron’s 1978 piece 
on public spending is still one of the most important theoretical sources on the topic. He 
identifies five potential causes for the rise in public expenditures in most industrialized 
countries during the post-war era: economic, fiscal, political, institutional, and international. 
I will treat each of these causes in turn, referring to more recent findings periodically. First, 
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Cameron posits that economic growth could be inversely related to levels of public spend-
ing. While it is generally true that a nation collectively demands more public services as it 
becomes more affluent, consistent economic growth allows the government to extract a 
constant share of the private economy to meet the demand. However, if growth is stagnant 
or negative, demand for services is likely to increase, and the government will have to ex-
tract an increasingly larger share of the economy to pay for public services (Cameron 1978). 
This implies that poor economic performance leads to increased public spending.
 Second, political parties in industrialized countries have an incentive to offer payments 
to the largest sections of the electorate in order to maintain power, especially those parties 
whose power base is concentrated in lower income groups. Traditionally, leftist parties have 
drawn the majority of their support from these groups, so it comes as no surprise that they 
have generally favored expanding government budgets to deliver more social services. Ac-
cording to Cameron, spending trajectories in Britain change noticeably between Labour 
and Conservative governments, and the budgets of American federal agencies increased 
with Democratic control of the presidency and the Congress (1978, 1252). Adsera and Boix 
(2002) make similar theoretical claims. Using game theory to formally model state budgets, 
they find that social welfare spending depends heavily on the ideological preferences of the 
incumbent party, independent of international pressures. 
Third, Cameron argues that those states that are most able to conceal the costs of social 
programs are the best equipped to increase levels of public expenditures. Because the costs 
and benefits of public goods are often not directly linked, politicians can only successfully 
provide more by making the taxes that pay for them invisible. Value added taxes and payroll 
taxes are the most effective (1978, 1253). 
Fourth, the existence of multiple independent centers of public authority and the 
degree of fiscal centralization could constrain or enhance policy makers’ ability to increase 
public spending. Institutionally, a decentralized system is ill-equipped to generate consensus 
on any single issue relative to more centralized systems. Careja and Emmenegger (2009) 
present a similar argument. The number of institutional veto points should be inversely 
related to public spending levels because as the number of veto points increases, it becomes 
increasingly difficult to pass legislation, appropriate funds, and ultimately spend them. On 
the other hand, strong centralized governments with fewer veto points pass legislation with 
relative ease, appropriate funds with less bickering, and consequently spend more than de-
centralized, federal systems (1978, 1252). 
Finally, Cameron argues that international forces could shape the level of domestic po-
litical spending. Specifically, the degree of economic dependence on actors in other coun-
tries may make it more difficult for policy makers to stabilize macroeconomic conditions 
with counter-cyclical fiscal policy. Policy makers respond by eliminating the uncertainty 
with social insurance and other automatic stabilizers that smooth out the peaks and valleys 
of international business cycles (1978, 1252). Adsera and Boix (2002) make similar claims, 
though for different reasons. Depending on its resources and level of support, a pro free-
trade political party may only be able to sustain power by offering compensation packages 
to those adversely affected by increased openness. Sustained financial openness over a long 
period of time would therefore imply increased levels of public spending (2002, 235). 
Empirically, there are several key findings that are common to the majority of the lit-
erature. First, domestic politics matter. Leftist party incumbency is robustly related to higher 
levels of public spending across several studies (Cameron 1978; Careja and Emmenegger 
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2009). In general, public expenditures increase with economic contractions or stagnant 
growth (Cameron 1978), and openness, depending on the definition, is weakly related to 
increases in social welfare spending (Rodrik 1998; Careja and Emmenegger 2009; Adsera 
and Boix 2002; Cameron 1978). In order to examine the effects of European integration 
on public expenditures, it would therefore be important to control for each of these factors: 
financial openness, leftist party incumbency, and economic performance. 
But why would EU integration constrain state budgets in the first place? The clearest 
answer is in the Maastricht criteria, which outlines a set of conditions each member state 
must meet before entering the Euro area. According to Johnson (2006), the European Cen-
tral Bank has interpreted the Maastricht Treaty’s conditions using the following monetary 
and fiscal requirements: (1) inflation rates of no more than 1.5 percent above the average of 
the three member states with the lowest inflation rates; (2) a public debt less than 60 per-
cent of GDP; (3) a budget deficit below 3% of GDP; and (4) participation in ERM II for at 
least two years within an exchange rate band of up to ± 15 percent, but likely narrower in 
practice (2006, 370). Johnson interviewed scores of central bankers across the EU’s newest 
states in Central and Eastern Europe, and found that virtually all of them were committed to 
strict monetary policies to control inflation. Their elected counterparts in parliament were 
not as committed, which led to frequent disagreements. Maintaining low inflation targets is 
difficult if the central government cannot break profligate spending habits, and Maastricht’s 
fiscal criteria on overall debt and annual deficits would clearly constrain state spending. This 
would imply that satisfying the Maastricht criteria would do exactly what critics on the left 
are so suspicious of—constrain welfare state spending. Because most central bankers were 
committed to hitting the Maastricht exchange rate and inflation targets (Johnson 2006), I 
restrict my analysis to the fiscal aspects of the treaty.   
In light of previous research, the best way to analyze the relationship between public 
spending and EU integration is to examine the effects of satisfying each Maastricht criterion 
while controlling for leftist party incumbency, economic performance, and openness. This 
restricts the scope of the study to a manageable time horizon (between 1990 and the present) 
and sample of countries (current EU member states). 
Hypotheses, Data, and Methodology
The preceding theoretical and empirical results imply two testable hypotheses: 
H1: EU member states pursuing EMU membership decrease public spending levels 
independent of leftist party incumbency and other relevant controls.
H2: Leftist party incumbency is robustly related to public expenditures even after con-
trolling for the pursuit of EMU membership.
In order to parse out the causal effects of outside EU pressures and internal domestic 
political forces, I will estimate the following population models of public spending:
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Left is a dichotomous variable indicating leftist party incumbency, X is a vector of economic 
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control variables2, δ
t
Year represents fixed effects for each year in the sample, and CEE is a 
regional dummy variable for Central and Eastern European countries3. I lag each indepen-
dent variable one period. Note that comparing the estimates of δ
1
 in equations (1) and (2) is 
a direct test of H1 and H2. If leftist party incumbency is a significant determinant of public 
spending measures in both equations, the Maastricht Treaty criteria do not constrain public 
spending. Alternatively, if δ
1
 is significant in equation (1) but not in (2), this implies that 
the fears of leftist Eurosceptics are justified; European integration can constrain the national 
welfare state.   
I use five different measures of public spending: total government expenditure, social 
protection spending, education expenditure, defense spending, and expenditures on health 
as percentages of GDP. Eurostat reports values for each of these variables for all current EU 
members between 1994 and 2008 (2010). Measuring the dependent variable in this way is 
a common approach in the literature (Cameron 1978, Careja and Emmenegger 2009). To 
better approximate the linear model I have specified and to ease interpretation, I take the 
natural log of each public spending variable. Estimates of δ
1
 represent the average percentage 
change in public spending/GDP that results from the government changing hands between 
parties on the right to parties on the left4.  
It is important to note that trends in the political composition of parliaments and public 
spending might move together over time, but that does not necessarily mean that one causes 
the other. In order to adjust for this potential bias, I also include the level of total expendi-
ture lagged one period and dummy variables for each year as controls in order to account for 
spurious correlations over time. The coefficients on each independent variable can therefore 
be interpreted as the average deviation from the natural trend of public spending resulting 
from one-unit increases in each independent variable.  
To measure financial openness and economic performance, I use net trade and FDI 
inflows as percentages of GDP, annual GDP growth, and GDP per capita (World Bank 
2010). I measure leftist party incumbency according to the University of Berne’s Compara-
tive Political Data Set III (Armingeon et al. 2010). The authors report the annual percentage 
of cabinet posts held by leftist, centrist, and conservative party members, weighted by the 
number of days the government was in office each year. I created a dichotomous variable 
Left, which equals one if a centrist or leftist party was in power and zero otherwise5.      
Finally, to measure EU integration I use data from Eurostat and the World Bank to 
create two variables that measure the degree of Maastricht Treaty compliance along two 
dimensions: annual budget deficits and total debt. All countries under the 3 percent deficit 
threshold are coded zero, and countries with annual deficits in excess of 3 percent of GDP 
are coded according to the following simple formula: Budget Deficit + 3 = Distance from 
Maastricht. A country with a 5.3 percent budget deficit in 1995 would receive a value of 
2 I control for a country’s level of public expenditure in the previous year, GDP per capita lagged one period, and 
the percentage growth in GDP per capita from the previous year. See Appendix B for a full description of each 
variable.
3 CEE countries have systematically lower levels of public expenditures as a percentage of GDP compared to their 
Western European counterparts. There is also some concern in the literature that the centrist parties in CEE have 
different policy commitments than social democrats in Western Europe (see Careja and Emmenegger, 2009).
4 More specifically, the effect on the spending to GDP ratio is 100(δ
1
)%.
5 According to the authors, ‘Centrist’ parties would include the UK’s Labour Party and the USA’s Democratic 
Party, which clearly have commitments to the welfare state that are not shared by their counterparts on the right. 
Leftist parties are social democrats and socialists.
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-2.3 for that year6. Total government debt is coded similarly with 60 percent of GDP as the 
threshold. The idea is that countries might be willing to cut back welfare benefits to reach 
the Maastricht thresholds, but any further cuts would be idiosyncratic. In order to recover 
the effect the Maastricht thresholds have on leftist parties’ ability to maintain spending levels, 
I interact leftist party incumbency with each Maastricht control variable, creating two vari-
ables that measure the degree of compliance while leftist parties have control of parliament. 
The coefficients on each interaction term therefore represent the effect of the degree of 
Maastricht compliance on public spending during periods of leftist party incumbency. 
There are two possible results that would vindicate leftist Eurosceptics: (1) leftist in-
cumbency is not related to public expenditures after controlling for Maastricht Treaty satis-
faction, and (2) the coefficient on each Maastricht interaction term is statistically significant 
and negative. This would indicate that, on average, Social Democrats and Socialists have to 
curb welfare spending as they approach Maastricht thresholds7.     
Results
Table 1 (see page 30) reports the results from regressions on total public expenditure 
with and without the Maastricht treaty controls. As expected, the coefficient on leftist party 
incumbency is statistically and substantively significant (p < 0.01) in the first estimate. On 
average, and controlling for openness and economic performance, moving a government 
from conservative hands to leftist party control increases the ratio of total public expenditure 
to GDP by 1.7 percent. To put these numbers in context, the average GDP for EU coun-
tries in 2007 was roughly $600 billion. This would amount to spending increases of $10 
billion annually, independent of previous spending levels and natural increases over time. 
Also note that the adjusted r-squared is 0.904, meaning the model explains more than 90% 
of the variation in total public spending to GDP ratios.
After controlling for Maastricht treaty compliance, the estimated effect decreases to 
only 0.3 percent, and it is no longer statistically distinguishable from zero. In addition, the 
Maastricht Deficit interaction term is statistically significant and negative. At first glance, this 
result seems to suggest that the grievances of leftist Eurosceptics are justified. Political parties 
committed to higher levels of government spending lose their ability to deliver benefits to 
their constituencies as their countries approach Maastricht Treaty fiscal thresholds.  
The results on levels of social protection, education, defense, and health expenditures 
paint a more nuanced picture. Table 2 (see page 31) reports the estimated effects on both 
social protection and health care spending as percentages of GDP.
6 This measure does not take into account when member states joined the EU. I make the simplifying assump-
tion that aggressive moves towards the Maastricht thresholds would only show up in anticipation of, or after, EU 
membership. For example, countries in CEE and Scandinavia joined the EU halfway through my time horizon 
of interest. However, it seems unlikely that aggressive steps to trim budget deficits and debt levels would be taken 
systematically across new EU member states without some external motivation.  Moreover, the causal impact on 
public expenditures would be the same regardless of whether fiscal strategies changed in anticipation of accession 
or after EU membership was already secured.  
7 Interpreting interaction terms can be difficult. Methodologically, both the Maastricht compliance variables and 
the interaction terms must be included in each regression. The correct interpretation is to add the coefficients of 
the interaction term and its components together. To simplify presentation, I report only the interaction terms in 
the results section, but the reported effects in the text take the full model into account. Full results are available in 
Appendix A. 
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Table 1
Dependant Variable: Total Expenditure
(1) (2)
Lagged Gov. Expenditure .0179
(.00085)
.0205
(.00048)
Leftist Party Incumbency .0172
(.0059)
.0029
(.0061)
Net Trade/GDP -.0002
(.0001)
-.0001
(.00007)
FDI Inflows/GDP -.0000
(.0001)
.0001
(.00005)
GDP Annual Growth -.0061
(.0014)
-.0062
(.0014)
GDP Percapita .0000
(.00000)
-.0001
(.00003)
(Maastricht Deficit) x (Leftist In-
cumbency)
-.0107
(.0034)
(Maastricht Debt) x (Leftist Incum-
bency)
-.0001
(.0001)
Constant 3.00
(.03)
2.91
(.02)
Regional Dummies Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 .907 .924
N 355 306
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are given below each coefficient in 
parentheses. Bolded coefficients are significant at the .05 level or below. Each independent 
variable is lagged one period.
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Table 2
Dependent Variable: Social Protection Health Care
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged Gov. Expenditure .056
(.0014)
.058
(.0014)
.179
(.007)
.180
(.008)
Leftist Party Incumbency .0198
(.0063)
.0207
(.0063)
.0002
(.010)
-.0005
(.013)
Net Trade/GDP -.0003
(.0001)
-.0002
(.0001)
.00003
(.0001)
.00002
(.0001)
FDI Inflows/GDP .0003
(.0001)
.0003
(.0001)
-.0001
(.0001)
-.0001
(.0001)
GDP Annual Growth -.013
(.0023)
-.012
(.0024)
.0006
(.0021)
.0021
(.0027)
GDP Percapita .0000
(.00000)
.0000
(.00000)
.0000
(.00000)
.0000
(.00000)
(Maastricht Deficit) x (Left-
ist Incumbency)
-.0026
(.0045)
.0054
(.0066)
(Maastricht Deficit) x (Left-
ist Incumbency)
-.0006
(.00037)
-.0005
(.0006)
Constant 1.89
(.032)
1.85
(.034)
.69
(.04)
.67
(.04)
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 .957 .960 .886 .886
N 308 278 325 285
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are given below each coefficient in 
parentheses. Bolded coefficients are significant at the .05 level or below. Each independent 
variable is lagged one period.
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Note that the leftist incumbency coefficient is statistically significant in both social 
protection regressions, and that the Maastricht compliance interaction terms are not signifi-
cant in either set of spending models. The estimates indicate that on average, moving from 
a conservative government to a centrist/leftist government increases the social protection 
spending/GDP ratio by about 2 percent. This would increase the average EU member state 
level of social protection spending from 17 percent to 17.34 percent. While this effect may 
not appear meaningful at first glance, it amounts to an increase of about $2.04 billion in 
housing subsidies, pensions, and transfers to low income families8. The interaction terms in 
the social protection regressions indicate that levels of spending are not sensitive to the de-
gree of Maastricht compliance during periods when Social Democrats, Socialists, and other 
parties on the left have control of the government. That is, countries that have a majority of 
leftist parties in their parliaments and are in compliance with Maastricht’s fiscal criteria have 
spending levels no different from countries with leftist parliaments that are not in compli-
ance. This result holds in the health expenditure regressions, and indicates that while Maas-
tricht compliance might cap the overall level of public spending, the allocation of available 
funds is determined by domestic political processes, not Brussels technocrats. 
If Maastricht compliance affects the overall level of public expenditures but not so-
cial welfare spending, it stands to reason that leftist parties must trim some components of 
their state budgets in lieu of social protection and health expenditures. Table 3 examines 
this proposition in more detail, reporting results for the same model used in the two previ-
ous tables, but substituting defense and education expenditures as the dependent variables. 
The results for education expenditures mirror those of health spending; leftist controlled 
compliant states appear to spend just as much on education as non-compliant leftist states. 
The defense spending estimates are a bit more puzzling. The coefficients for leftist party 
incumbency are statistically significant and appear quite large in each regression. The point 
estimates for the effect of leftist party control of parliament on levels of defense spending are 
about 4.5 percent, which is more than twice as large as the social protection coefficients. 
Upon closer examination however, the effect is not as large as it may seem at first 
glance. First, the average ratio of defense spending to GDP among EU member states was 
1.4 percent in 2007. Increasing this ratio by 4.5 percent moves the average member state 
from spending 1.4 percent of its GDP on defense to 1.463 percent. Substantively, this 
amounts to increasing defense spending from an EU average level of $8.4 billion to $8.77 
billion. This effect is less than one-fifth of the leftist effect on social protection spending. I 
have also not included any controls for European involvement in the wars in Iraq and Af-
ghanistan, which steadily increased throughout the 2000s. Coincidently, the proportion of 
EU member states controlled by leftist parties also increased during the same time period. In 
2004 for example, 44 percent of EU member states had leftist majorities in their parliaments. 
By 2006 the percentage had increased to 63 percent9. Including a measure of each EU 
member state’s military commitment to the Iraq and Afghanistan wars in the defense spend-
ing regressions would certainly attenuate the estimated effect, but it is still surprising to find 
no evidence that leftist parties roll back defense spending in favor of social welfare spending.
Restricting the analysis to the time period in the sample that precedes the 9/11 attacks 
8 The average EU member state had a GDP of about $600 billion and the social protection spending/GDP was 
17%. Increasing this ratio by 2 percent yields 17.34 %, which moves the level of spending from $102 billion to 
$104.04 billion.
9 Author’s own calculation based on University of Bern’s Comparative Political Dataset III
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yields more intuitive results, and I report them below in Table 4. The coefficient on leftist 
party incumbency decreases from 0.045 to -0.035 and is no longer statistically significant. 
In addition, the Maastricht interaction variables have large negative coefficients, and are 
now statistically significant (P<0.05). Using only the observations before 2001 decreases 
the sample size from 285 to just 69. This inflates the standard errors of each coefficient and 
makes it more difficult to distinguish the estimated effects from zero, which may explain 
why the leftist incumbency coefficient matches the magnitude of the social protection and 
total expenditure findings, but is not statistically distinguishable from zero. 
Table 3
Dependent Variable: Defense Expenditure Education 
Expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged Gov. Expenditure .485
(.035)
.503
(.048)
.190
(.0037)
.189
(.0011)
Leftist Party Incumbency .048
(.019)
.043
(.021)
.0001
(.0066)
-.0001
(.0008)
Net Trade/GDP -.0013
(.0004)
-.0012
(.0004)
.0001
(.0001)
.0001
(.0009)
FDI Inflows/GDP -.0018
(.0005)
-.0017
(.0005)
-.00003
(.00010)
-.00002
(.00007)
GDP Annual Growth -.010
(.005)
-.014
(.006)
.0017
(.0018)
-.0014
(.0021)
GDP Percapita -.00001
(.00000)
-.00001
(.00000)
.0000
(.00000)
.0000
(.00000)
(Maastricht Deficit) x (Leftist 
Incumbency)
-.0053
(.0135)
-- -.0001
(.0060)
(Maastricht Deficit) x (Leftist 
Incumbency)
-.0012
(.0016)
-- -.0003
(.0062)
Constant -.20
(.08)
-.18
(.11)
.60
(.02)
.63
(.03)
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 .857 .845 .938 .939
N 325 285 325 285
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are given below each coefficient in 
parentheses. Bolded coefficients are significant at the .05 level or below. Each independent 
variable is lagged one period.
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With these caveats in mind, the point estimates confirm the results from the regressions 
on total and social protection expenditures. The Maastricht fiscal interaction terms are about 
-0.025, which implies that leftist governments decrease the defense spending/GDP ratio 
by 2.5 percent for every percentage-point move towards the Maastricht fiscal thresholds. 
In real terms, an EU member state that cuts defense spending to reduce a 5 percent budget 
deficit would decrease its defense spending/GDP ratio by about 5 percent (2 × -2.5), from 
1.4 percent of GDP to 1.33 percent of GDP. Substantively, that amounts to a decrease in 
defense spending from $8.4 billion to $7.98 billion, a decline of more than $400 million10. 
Table 4 - Defense Spending between 1990 and 2000
Dependent Variable: Defense Expenditure
(1)
Lagged Government Expenditure .603
(.022)
Leftist Party Incumbency -.035
(.038)
Net Trade/GDP -.0002
(.0005)
FDI Inflows/GDP -.0055
(.0055)
GDP Annual Growth -.016
(.008)
GDP Percapita .0000
(.0000)
(Maastricht Deficit) x (Leftist Incumbency) -.026
(.012)
(Maastricht Deficit) x (Left Incumbency) -.024
(.012)
Constant -.494
(.114)
Regional Dummies Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes
Adjusted R2 .932
N 69
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are given below each coefficient in 
parentheses. Bolded coefficients are significant at the .05 level or below. Each independent 
variable is lagged one period.
10 This effect is relative to conservative governments. The overall Maastricht effect is smaller. See the appendix for 
full results. 
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The results for total expenditures and spending on defense, social protection, health, 
and education paint a clear picture. The fiscal constraints of the Maastricht Treaty may have 
capped overall levels of government spending to some extent, but there is no effect on the 
allocation of government resources to specific programs. This implies that the concerns of 
leftist Eurosceptics may therefore be more of a political calculation than a substantive policy 
concern, a proposition I explore in more detail in the next section. 
Conclusion
As the European integration experiment continues, the voices of Eurosceptics from 
both ends of the ideological spectrum are likely to get louder, if not more numerous. As-
suaging their concerns is likely to be an important part of winning over the European 
public in support of further integration. While the concerns of Eurosceptics on the right 
are the topic of another paper, I have demonstrated that the grievances on the left may not 
be justifiable empirically. Social Democrats antagonistic to European integration have long 
argued that the EU is a liberalizing agent. The closer countries move toward Brussels, the 
further away they will find themselves from the post-war social contract that has come to 
characterize European society. The most powerful EU-level effect on domestic budgets, 
and therefore the most promising vindicator of leftist skeptics concerns, is probably the 
Maastricht Treaty criteria for European Monetary Union. Controlling for those criteria that 
affect domestic fiscal policies most directly, it does not appear that leftist parties have lost 
their ability to extend generous welfare state benefits to their constituents. In other words, 
maintaining budget deficits below 3 percent of GDP might slow the growth of total public 
expenditures, but the allocation of public revenues between defense, education, social pro-
tection, and education seems to be determined by domestic political processes. 
If the fiscal requirements of Maastricht do not significantly constrain the policy options 
of domestic political actors, the relevant question is why politicians on the left are using 
Eurosceptic rhetoric. One potential explanation is that the European left is searching for a 
way to reassemble its electoral base after some recent setbacks. Since 2005, Social Democrats 
and Socialists across Europe have seen their share of parliamentary seats diminish. Germany’s 
Social Democratic Party saw an 11 percent decline between 2005 and 2009. The French 
Socialist Party’s parliamentary seats are down 12 percent from 5 years ago, and French Presi-
dent Nicolas Sarkozy’s conservative UMP party has increased its appeal among low-skilled 
workers, a demographic that traditionally voted Socialist. Gordon Brown’s embattled La-
bour Party is on the verge of losing power, polling lower than it has in decades, and the Por-
tuguese Socialists lost 26 seats in the 2009 elections (Nordsieck 2010). Clearly the biggest 
problem for these parties is persistent unemployment and an unfavorable economic climate 
resulting from the financial crisis. Many Social Democrats and Socialists had the misfortune 
of being in power between 2007 and 2009, so their losses are not particularly surprising. 
What is surprising is that the French conservatives have managed to stay in power 
despite similar economic constraints. Some argue that the UMP has been successful in 
part because they have been able to siphon votes away from Jean-Marie Le Pen’s National 
Front Party, which is unapologetically anti-immigration, anti-European, and has also tra-
ditionally drawn its support from low-skilled, middle-income workers that traditionally 
supported the Socialists (Berezin 2006, 270). While the National Front’s primary grievance 
is a perceived cultural threat from Muslim immigrants, Le Pen has railed against the out 
sourcing of French jobs to Central and Eastern Europe, blaming European integration for 
Does EU Integration Constrain Social Welfare Spending?
Ryan Merriman Brigham	Young	University36
France’s persistently high unemployment rate (Berezin 2006, 272). This claim resonates 
with a majority of the French public; in 2005 after France voted against the Lisbon Treaty in 
a national referendum, the European Commission reported that the fear of unemployment 
was the primary reason for respondents’ “no” votes (Berezin 2006, 273). Attacking further 
European integration as an assault on ‘social Europe’ could draw middle-income voters back 
into the Socialist Party’s fold. 
In the Netherlands, there is some evidence this has already taken place. The Dutch 
Social Democratic Party (PvdA) received just 15.1 percent of the vote in 2002, its lowest 
recorded vote share since WW II. However, under the care of its outspoken Eurosceptic 
leader Wouter Bos, the PvdA currently leads all other Dutch political parties in the public 
opinion polls, just in front of the right-wing Eurosceptic Party for Freedom (PVV) (Dutch 
Political Report 2010). Bos has been critical of what he perceives as the EU’s dogmatic ad-
herence to opening markets for goods, services, people and capital despite the adverse social 
consequences. After losing a quarter of his party’s seats to conservative and leftist populists 
in 2006, Bos delivered a speech at the annual gathering of progressive European party lead-
ers held in London and outlined a plan for future electoral success on the center-left. He 
warned that the forces of globalization and European integration “affect social democrats 
more profoundly than any other political grouping. [They] reduce the effectiveness of the 
kind of policies we favour [sic]. [They] affect the cohesion that is our life blood. And [they] 
affect the traditional constituents that remain so important to us because they are the ones 
who feel threatened, who may become uncertain, cynical, populist, or worse.” (Bos 2008, 
2). To meet these challenges, Bos argued that Social Democrats and Labour parties should 
“become less academic and more populist,” catering to the demands of low and middle-
income voters that had deserted them (Bos 2008, 3).   
These brief examples, while anecdotal and unsystematic, suggest that parties on both 
the center-left and the center-right have successfully adopted Eurosceptic under currents 
usually expressed only at the extreme ends of the ideological spectrum. The context of 
Bos’ remarks indicates that Social Democrats across Europe are aware of the Dutch Labour 
Party’s recent success, and the experience of the French Socialist Party demonstrates that 
the challenges Bos identifies are not unique to the Netherlands. If European integration 
does not actually limit the choices of domestic political actors, and I have presented some 
evidence that it does not, then the concerns of Eurosceptic leftist leaders may be nothing 
more than a political calculation designed to recapture the middle-income voters that have 
recently flocked to anti-immigration parties on the right. Whether the political posturing 
will take place across Europe or whether an economic recovery will render such a strategy 
unnecessary remains to be seen. 
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Appendix A
Table 1
Dependant Variable: Total Expenditure
(1) (2)
Lagged Gov. Expenditure .0182
(.0008)
.0205
(.00048)
Leftist Party Incumbency .0182
(.0057)
.0029
(.0061)
Net Trade/GDP -.0002
(.0001)
-.0001
(.00007)
FDI Inflows/GDP -.0000
(.0001)
.0001
(.00005)
GDP Annual Growth -.0057
(.0014)
-.0062
(.0014)
GDP Percapita .0000
(.00000)
-.0001
(.00003)
Maastricht Deficit .015
(.003)
Maastricht Debt -.0006
(.0002)
(Maastricht Deficit) x (Leftist In-
cumbency)
-.0107
(.0034)
(Maastricht Debt) x (Leftist Incum-
bency)
-.0001
(.0001)
Constant 2.99
(.03)
2.91
(.02)
Regional Dummies Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 .907 .924
N 355 306
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Table 2
Dependent Variable: Social Protection Health Care
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged Gov. Expenditure .056
(.0014)
.058
(.0014)
.179
(.007)
.180
(.008)
Leftist Party Incumbency .0198
(.0063)
.0207
(.0063)
.0002
(.010)
-.0005
(.013)
Net Trade/GDP -.0003
(.0001)
-.0002
(.0001)
.00003
(.0001)
.00002
(.0001)
FDI Inflows/GDP .0003
(.0001)
.0003
(.0001)
-.0001
(.0001)
-.0001
(.0001)
GDP Annual Growth -.013
(.0023)
-.012
(.0024)
.0006
(.0021)
.0021
(.0027)
GDP Percapita .0000
(.00000)
.0000
(.00000)
.0000
(.00000)
.0000
(.00000)
Maastricht Deficit -.005
(.004)
-.0083
(.0060)
Maastricht Debt -.0008
(.0003)
-.000
(.000)
(Maastricht Deficit) x (Left-
ist Incumbency)
-.0026
(.0045)
.0054
(.0066)
(Maastricht Debt) x (Leftist 
Incumbency)
-.0006
(.00037)
-.0005
(.0006)
Constant 1.89
(.032)
1.85
(.034)
.69
(.04)
.67
(.04)
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 .957 .960 .886 .886
N 308 278 325 285
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Table 3
Dependent Variable: Defense Expenditure Education 
Expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged Gov. Expenditure .485
(.035)
.503
(.048)
.190
(.0037)
.189
(.0011)
Leftist Party Incumbency .048
(.019)
.043
(.021)
.0001
(.0066)
-.0001
(.0008)
Net Trade/GDP -.0013
(.0004)
-.0012
(.0004)
.0001
(.0001)
.0001
(.0009)
FDI Inflows/GDP -.0018
(.0005)
-.0017
(.0005)
-.00003
(.00010)
-.00002
(.00007)
GDP Annual Growth -.010
(.005)
-.014
(.006)
.0017
(.0018)
-.0014
(.0021)
GDP Percapita -.00001
(.00000)
-.00001
(.00000)
.0000
(.00000)
.0000
(.00000)
Maastricht Deficit -.005
(.013)
.0085
(.0044)
Maastricht Debt .001
(.001)
.0007
(.0005)
(Maastricht Deficit) x (Leftist 
Incumbency)
.022
(.015)
-- -.0001
(.0060)
(Maastricht Debt) x (Leftist 
Incumbency)
-.0012
(.0016)
-- -.0003
(.0062)
Constant -.20
(.08)
-.18
(.11)
.60
(.02)
.63
(.03)
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 .857 .845 .938 .939
N 325 285 325 285
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Table 4 - Defense Spending between 1990 and 2000
Dependent Variable: Defense Expenditure
(1)
Lagged Government Expenditure .603
(.022)
Leftist Party Incumbency -.035
(.038)
Net Trade/GDP -.0002
(.0005)
FDI Inflows/GDP -.0055
(.0055)
GDP Annual Growth -.016
(.008)
GDP Percapita .0000
(.0000)
Maastricht Deficit .021
(.008)
Maastricht Debt .023
(.011)
(Maastricht Deficit) x (Leftist Incumbency) -.026
(.012)
(Maastricht Debt) x (Left Incumbency) -.024
(.012)
Constant -.494
(.114)
Regional Dummies Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes
Adjusted R2 .932
N 69
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Appendix B
Data Set Descriptive Statistics
Variable Units, Source Mean Standard Dev.
Total Public 
Spending
% of GDP, Eurostat 45.74 7.47
Social Protection 
Spending
% of GDP, Eurostat 16.40 4.42
Health Spending % of GDP, Eurostat 5.71 1.31
Education Spending % of GDP, Eurostat 5.45 1.16
Defense Spending % of GDP, Eurostat 1.59 .69
Leftisti Party 
Incumbency
0 - 1, University of 
Bem, CPDS III
.546 .49
Net trade % of GDP, WDI 95.77 46.69
Net FDI Inflows % of GDP, WDI 8.76 40.46
GDP Per Capita 
Growth
Annual % growth, 
WDI
2.22 4.24
GDP Per Capita Current USD, WDI 20292.73 16556.45
Annual Budget 
Deficits
% of GDP, Eurostat -1.58 3.92
Government Gross 
Debt
% of GDP, Eurostat 49.16 28.40
GDP Current USD, WDI 395 Billion 641 Billion
Central/Eastern Europe Dummy Variable
The following countries are coded “1” and all other EU member states not listed are 
coded “0”: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania, Slovenia
Reported means and standard deviations are for the entire data set, which covers 27 
countries between 1990 and 2008. The EU member state averages used for calculating 
substantive effects in the paper are from 2007.
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